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I n the 1960s, the descent versus alliance debate domi-nated kinship studies-anthropologists wanted to de-termine what relationship offered the best analyticlens for understanding how social groups were formed.Those who favored descent felt that the most relevant
question to ask was how groups constituted and reconsti-
tuted themselves across generations. From the perspective
of descent theorists, existential facts—death and genera-
tional shifts—ensured that all social groups had to resolve
the problem of maintaining themselves as continuous units.
Alliance theorists took issue with this emphasis, believing
that constructing group boundaries was an equally impor-
tant task and one that required a focus on marriage as the
beginning point for analysis. This debate was more than an
argument about which type of relationship was more im-
portant. Those involved were questioning how best to un-
derstand the ways groups were constituted through kinship.
In this review article, I ask a "what if question: What would
have happened in kinship studies if kinship theorists had
taken a third relationship—adoption—as a starting point?
Had anthropologists followed Jack Goody's (1969) initiative
in focusing on adoption, would this have led to a new per-
spective on relatedness?
Adoption is an intriguing third term in the context of
the debate because it contains the conundrums of both de-
scent and alliance. Adopting can be seen as one of the ways
that groups constitute themselves over time, and thus, it can
easily be understood as a supplement to descent. Adoption
can also be a way of exchanging people across groups and
rendering group boundaries visible. Thus, adopting can be
used to form alliances between different groups as anthro-
pologists, such as Bradd Shore (1976), have noted. Given
that adoption can be both descent and alliance, scholars ad-
vancing either perspective in the debate figure it as a secon-
dary (and dlsofictive) term. Yet, as the authors under review
demonstrate, adoption can be treated as more than a de-
rivative relationship, that is, as a case of descent or alliance
with a difference. To do so, however, requires that kinship
theorists reject the logic behind labeling adoption/zc/ii'e.
I am not suggesting that adoption can act as a bridge
between previous competing approaches to kinship. Rather, I
am suggesting that in some cultures the anxieties anthro-
pologists' interlocutors have about adoption could—if taken
seriously—lead scholars to ask different and new questions
about families. After all, adoption, unlike either descent or
marriage, can form a relationship that is widely accepted
and yet is secret at the same time. The tension inherent in
such a relationship can prompt anthropologists to think
about how knowledge and circulation of knowledge are in-
tegral components of how families fashion themselves.
In this article, I argue that using adoption as a starting
point can initiate conversations about kinship as an arena in
which people intertwine sociality with cultural knowledge
(in this case, the kinds of knowledge one must have to be ac-
cepted as a member of a community, be it of languages, eti-
quette, implicit social cues, and so on). Fredrik Barth has
recently encouraged anthropologists to ground their inves-
tigations into others' perspectives in analyses of knowledge,
to explore "how bodies of knowledge are produced in per-
sons and populations in the context of the social relations
they sustain" (2002:1). As Barth points out, studying knowl-
edge and its circulation leads anthropologists to understand
others' epistemological assumptions about how and why
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people are interconnected. Of the ways in which people
practice kinship, adoption turns out to be a productive site
to ask these questions because studying adoption reveals
people's understandings of the interconnections between
one's origin, assumptions about the nature of origins, un-
evenly disseminated knowledge of origins, and family or
cultural membership. Concretely, studying adoption can in-
troduce questions about how biological relatedness and
cultural knowledge are linked, about how knowledge circu-
lation plays a part in the process of making people kin, and
even about how families respond to other perspectives they
encounter on the ways kin and kin-like relations are fash-
ioned (including bureaucratic perspectives).
The very structure of adoption encourages researchers
and their interlocutors to be reflexive about how kin rela-
tions are formed and sustained. Both Jamila Bargach and Ju-
dith Modell examine how each member of an adopting triad
(birth parents, adopting parents, and adoptees) thinks about
constructing family—Bargach in Morocco and Modell in the
United States.1 Ann Laura Stoler asks strikingly similar ques-
tions but at a different level of scale. She is concerned with
the difficulties Dutch colonial officials experienced while at-
tempting to form a colony in Indonesia. The officials strug-
gled to ascertain when children, of both mixed and Euro-
pean parentage, demonstrated the right knowledge to be
considered white Europeans. Juxtaposing Stoler's account
of colonialism with ethnographies of adoption brings to
light implicit concerns addressed in all three books. At stake
in both Modell's and Bargach's accounts is not Just a ques-
tion of the cultural assumptions underlying how non-kin
can be transformed into kin. Both authors also discuss the
kinds of cultural and familial knowledge one is supposed to
be able to exhibit to be part of a family. All three accounts
show that belonging emerges from the ways in which peo-
ple know who they and others are, making such knowledge
central to cultural identity. Before I continue with over-
arching comparisons, I lay some common groundwork by
discussing each author's ethnographic and theoretical
stakes in her respective project.
A sealed and secret kinship
Two themes run through A Sealed and Secret Kinship, Judith
Modell's most recent ethnography of U.S. adoption prac-
tices. Modell starts by delineating how a shift from adoption
legislated as closed to adoption legislated as potentially
open has affected the adoption triad. In 2000, the Oregon
state government granted adult adoptees access to records
that had previously been sealed. Other states are consider-
ing similar legislation. Modell discusses what led up to this
change in some public U.S. attitudes toward adoption. She
begins with origin stories, not of biological births but,
rather, of activism, discussing how two U. S. support groups
emerged in the mid-1970s—one for birth parents and one
for adoptees. The actors in her accounts are uneasy partici-
pants in contexts where their needs always seem to be
thwarted—be it an adoptee's need for his or her family medical
history or a mother's need to be recognized as such. Activism is
a response to these vexations. These and other unanswered
needs all center on how and when certain knowledges circu-
late, producing recognitions and identities (either official or
other). As Modell persuasively argues (p. 69), the shifts in adop-
tion are not creating new forms of families, just new ways peo-
ple can gain knowledge about their own families.
Modell's second, related theme concerns the social and
institutional consequences of addressing adoption as a site
in which the parent-child relationship can self-consciously
be created by birth parents, adopting parents, social work-
ers, judges, legislators, and others. She begins her analysis of
U.S. adoption by looking at how legislation ensuring its se-
crecy impacted adoptees, birth parents, and adopting par-
ents. Modell traces the ways in which people involved in
adoption shaped their identities in connection to a silenced
origin story, and she describes the highly charged feelings
both adoptees and birth parents attached to having knowl-
edge of each other. Having laid out the ways in which people
responded to knowledge that was not meant to circulate,
she turns to consider the other participants involved in
shaping the current shifting forms of U.S. adoption. Here
she offers (as does Bargach) an important analytic service by
refusing to characterize families as existing independent of
or even codependently with government bureaucracies.
Rather, she portrays how families, social workers, policy
analysts, and others together construct the possibilities of
U.S. adoption.
Modell discusses how choice becomes a central motif
for thinking through U.S. adoption when families are seen
as products of conscious legislative, bureaucratic, and per-
sonal decisions. This element of choice at the heart of adop-
tion is problematic. In a U.S. context, once choice steps into
the picture, anxieties related to figuring it as consumer
choice are immediately present in the background.
The metaphor of a market and of preferences for particu-
lar items lurk at the sidelines of discussions of adoption,
and becomes an effective strategy for condemning
adoptions that do not go through agencies. To breathe
a word of selling and buying babies is enough, in Ameri-
can culture at any period, to damn the transaction in
parenthood, [p. 137]
The problem for Americans becomes how to couch a family
created by choice in terms that do not place a price on a hu-
man being. Adoption has become a site that Modell's inter-
locutors find both useful and difficult for thinking through
ways to distinguish between value generated by capital and
value generated by love. This dilemma has structured legis-
lation as well as the language and practices surrounding the
act of matching parents and children.
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As Modell delineates the changing roles that govern-
ment actors and family members are beginning to play vis-
a-vis one another, she is able to demonstrate how adoption
has increasingly become an ideal for families formed in
cases like foster care—situations in which both govern-
ments and families are acknowledged by all to be involved
deliberately in fashioning families. This is not to say that the
model of the family formed through familiar biological
events is any less the ideal for which all are supposed to
strive. Those in the business of producing hegemonic view-
points are clearly still interpreting adoption as the second-
best road to family—the path taken when nature does not
provide. But in the spaces where government officials and
families join together to form families, adoption is held as
the central paradigm. Modell writes,
At the beginning of the twenty-first century in the
United States, adoption dominates not only child wel-
fare but also other policy arenas: the war on drugs, the
fight to uphold family values, and the struggle to cut
federal government spending. The transaction has come
to bear many burdens on a national level, replacing
weak social welfare systems and upholding an ideology
of the family, [p. 107]
Modell then turns to the dilemmas created for foster care
families when adoption becomes such a powerful model for
evaluating all other forms of family.
Modell convincingly discusses how the tensions in U.S.
adoption surrounding choice and affection have become
the dominant framework for addressing foster care. She
points out that state officials create problems for foster par-
ents when they simultaneously evaluate these parents by
the idealized adoptive standard and view them as state em-
ployees. Foster parents are expected to parent with a differ-
ence, to parent with detachable and impermanent love (pp.
92-95). Because the state initially bought their parenting,
government officials often do not consider foster parents
acceptable adopting parents for those in their care (p. 83).
Modell eloquently argues that the dilemmas facing foster
parents can be found in the answer to the question "How
has foster care become a system while adoption is a version
of family" (p. 81)? Foster parents do not confront the para-
doxes adoption poses for Americans surrounding issues of
secrecy, the biological basis for love, or choice. Yet, ironi-
cally, the paradoxes they do face are created because they
operate in the shadow cast by adoption—they are being
paid to care.
Modell concludes with a rhetorical move that will be fa-
miliar to many readers comfortable with anthropological
comparisons—she asks what Polynesian adoptions can re-
veal about U.S. ones. Here Modell puts to good use her ear-
lier work on Hawaiian adoption, by discussing how people
might practice adoption when biological origin does not de-
termine the person or the relation (pp. 185-186). She points
out how unnecessary secrecy becomes in this framework
and she briefly sketches the ways families form when chil-
dren can move fluidly from one household to another with-
out guilt or blame.1' In short, Modell adeptly reveals ways of
responding to adoption that would establish relationships
that might contain fewer of the paradoxes that confront
those currently dealing with U.S. adoption.
Orphans of Islam
In Orphans of Islam, Jamila Bargach discusses the para-
doxes surrounding adoption in Morocco, focusing on her
Moroccan interlocutors' perspective of adoption as a margi-
nalized activity experienced by marginalized people. From
her first sentence, Bargach responds with anguish to the
ways in which her interlocutors in the field conflated being
adopted with being illegitimate, creating a treacherous limi-
nality. From an anthropological perspective, adoption en-
capsulates some of the central conflicts inherent in fashion-
ing families according to Moroccan (or, more generally.
Islamic) principles. These conflicts emerge when people
managing the exigencies of how children circulate among
families confront prescriptive cultural models of family built
on the assumption that true parental love must have a bio-
logical basis. As a Moroccan herself, Bargach writes uneasily
from the interstices of the anthropological perspective and
the ethnographic interlocutor's perspective.3 At its best, her
discomfort inspires her political outrage. At its worst, her
disquiet perhaps produces her convoluted sentences.
Bargach, like Modell, focuses on adoptions between
strangers in her book, particularly when the state plays a
part. She discusses in broad terms three possible forms of
adoption or fosterage in Morocco—first, informal, between
close kin (p. 27); second, secret, when a mother gives the
child to an intermediary who places the child with the
adopting parents (pp. 27-28); and, third, "legal guardian-
ship of a minor" (p. 28). She concentrates on adoption that
is secret or legal, reserving her discussion of informal adop-
tion for an article published elsewhere (Bargach 2001). In
laying out her analysis, Bargach chooses to illuminate her
points with poignant case studies, an evocative technique.
She refuses, however, to generalize from her case studies,
which has created some difficulties for me as a reviewer.4
Bargach does not provide answers to the following ques-
tions: How does class impinge on decisions made by the
adopting parents or the birth mothers?s Do different classes
practice some forms of adoption more often than other
forms? Who is instrumental in the decision to adopt? Do
adopting parents usually know the birth mother despite
their use of an intermediary? How old are children usually
when they are adopted? When and how do they find out
typically that they are adopted? In short, Bargach is an ana-
lyst who eschews making broad claims, choosing instead to
focus on particulars.
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Bargach has a difficult story to tell, largely because hers
is a context with too many villains and too few heroes with
the efficacy to right wrongs. Bargach analyzes a context in
which state bureaucracy—a familiar villain for many an-
thropologists—intervenes negatively in a process that is in
itself so flawed as to make most of the people involved un-
happy. Bargach's analysis unfolds in three parts. In the first
part, she uses evocative case studies to reveal how new state
policies only serve to exacerbate an already painful process.
Put bluntly, in Morocco, mothers cannot offer children for
adoption legally without bringing down moral condemna-
tion both on themselves and on the children (families can
circulate children—but exchange between families occurs
without state sanction [p. 27]). As a consequence, both
mothers and adopting parents want to keep adoptions se-
cret. Since 1962, Moroccan state policies have curtailed the
degree to which people can create such secrecy. All adop-
tions must now be sanctioned by the state, and the state
stands in as guardian for all abandoned children (pp.
41-42). Forcing the adoptive triad to engage with state bu-
reaucracy hampers prior ways of circulating people and
knowledge. But the state decrees go further—insisting that
adopted children cannot assume their new families' names.
The state thus has attempted to eradicate the secrecy neces-
sary to make adoption tolerable for all involved. Bargach
portrays state officials and the policies they implement as
the kind of villain common in recent tales of colonial and
postcolonial governance—well meaning but grounded in
assumptions disruptively antagonistic to any escape routes
already in place between families.
The state is not the only villain in the Moroccan adop-
tion setting—culture is, too. In part 2 of her book, Bargach
must lay out a difficult analysis: determining how the state
and culture both render adoption difficult. Social analysts
are comfortably familiar with exploring how government,
however well meaning, imposes a nuclear family ideal that
can only create harm when implementing rigid patriarchal
models. It is much more difficult to turn then to people's
cultural assumptions and find them equally destructive.
This is poignantly apparent when an interviewee (the ad-
ministrator of a hospital) asks Bargach point-blank for a so-
lution to adoption problems in Morocco. Bargach answers
that it would be best to change people's cultural beliefs
about adoption (p. 205), although she couches her reply in
more diplomatic terms. She is trapped in a situation where
the tools of her analysis reveal only the harmful limitations
of both of the traditional loci of transformation or salva-
tion—liberating government policies and liberating cultural
practices. This drives Bargach to conclude with a ringing
manifesto (pp. 216-217)—the conundrums she uncovers
drive her to employ the rhetoric of a revolutionary.
So what are the cultural assumptions that trap people
engaged with adoption in Morocco? I have already touched
on one of the core entrapping assumptions in discussing
how true familial love must have a biological root. Here let
me draw out some of the consequences of this assumption
that Bargach discusses. First, the adopting parents are al-
ways waiting for the children they are raising to leave in
search of their biological parents. Bargach explains, "In
other words, the love of adopting parents is overwhelming,
but cannot emulate that of the natural parents since it is not
based in physical commonality, or rather, extension" (p.
142). To adopt a child is always to risk losing the child. Fear
of such loss encourages adopting parents to keep the adop-
tion a secret. In addition, adopted children are expected to
enact the bad behavior that they have inherited from their
biological parents (most often, their mother) (p. 87). In
short, the ways in which Bargach's interlocutors imagined
people to have been born social means that adopted chil-
dren are always on the verge of undermining familial or so-
cial order.
In the third part of her analysis, Bargach examines
abandoned children and how they encapsulate the traumas
of what she terms modernity. In doing so, she turns to media
portrayals, commentators in the public sphere, and non-
governmental organization (NGO) workers dealing with
these children. Bargach believes that abandoned children
have become an embodiment of the failures of the state and
of families to respond adequately to the paradoxes of mod-
ernity (she uses the term modernity to stand for the "crisis of
contemporary Moroccan society" [p. 165]). When neither
state nor family can adequately respond to a created surplus
of children, the analyst will ask what other entities will inter-
vene? For Bargach, these entities are civil society—as repre-
sented by social workers in NGOs—and the public sphere—
represented by filmmakers, authors, and journalists. She
describes the work of NGOs both foreign and Moroccan
based, such as the League for the Protection of Children, the
Committee of Support to UNICEF, Moroccan Solidarity
Feminine, Terre des Hommes, and l'Entraide Nationale,
among others. These NGOs for the most part run orphan-
ages, providing health care, education, and shelter to aban-
doned children. Civil society is the hero of this analysis; Bar-
gach argues
that fundamental change can only originate from all
constituents of civil society (conservative and liberal
alike) since through their mere being, the passive accep-
tance of the status quo or the culture of victimization is
questioned for a possibility, and, at times, a reality of
discussion and dialogue, in addition to forcing the state
to assume its responsibility, [pp. 212-213]
In seeing civil society as the locus of change, Bargach places
the problems of abandoned children squarely at the feet of
people's cultural beliefs, despite her early forays into cri-
tiques of government policies. In her analysis, civil society
contains the only actors devoted to educating or transform-
ing people's attitudes, and thus it is the source of the adoptee's
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salvation. Bargach acknowledges problems found in civil
society—corruption, economic dependence on Western
funding agencies, and competition between NGOs—but
she mentions such problems only in passing; her ethno-
graphic attention is devoted to the children, with the NGOs
serving as the backdrop for circulating and raising children.
Bargach asks a question that preoccupies the other
authors under review as well—what happens to families when
the state determines the boundaries of the family? Adoption
for Bargach becomes a site for examining the ways in which
both the boundaries of the family and the boundaries be-
tween the state and the family are caught up in the same
paradoxical process. They are both unstable boundaries,
but, out of necessity, they are enacted as if they are stable. In
Bargach's account, this stability exists at the cost of those
who are adopted, and the moves toward legitimacy on the
part of both the state and the families end up costing those
people who most effectively symbolize the inherent insta-
bility. She concludes that, in Morocco, state assistance in
forming family boundaries is destructive, both because of
the rigidity of the state in its interventions and because of
the cultural ramifications of adoption.
Carnal knowledge and imperial power
With Bargach's and Modell's accounts in mind, I turn now
to the issues adoption raises as they are played out on an im-
perial rather than familial level. In Carnal Knowledge and
Imperial Power, Ann Laura Stoler writes about how Europe-
ans in various colonial regimes responded to a messiness in
categories embodied by their own families and colleagues.
Her larger argument continues her long-standing scholarly
commitment to bringing Foucauldian insights to bear on
colonial conceptions of race. In her latest book, she reviews
familiar ground—discussing the contradictions that clung
to the bodies of European women and the traps underpin-
ning mixtures of colonial desires and colonial moralities—
before exploring newer topics: children (both European and
mixed), servants, and schools. It is particularly in the details,
in Stoler's insights as she unfolds her archival findings, that
her analysis illuminates how colonial constructs of race and
desire were intertwined.
Foucault has provided Stoler with powerful analytical
tools for turning dusty colonial records into vivid accounts
of how colonial categories classified population in ineffec-
tive ways that simultaneously produced compelling para-
doxes. She adeptly traces the tensions and debates sur-
rounding classifications that went awry as a result of
contradictory impulses. These contradictions were neither
intrinsic to the melange of categories themselves nor cre-
ated by differences in how colonial regimes implemented
their efforts to control populations. She specifically turns
her investigative gaze to those figures whose very bodies
could become magnets for the contradictions inherent in
European colonial classifications—European women, Huro-
pean children, and mixed children all living in colonies, es-
pecially in Dutch-controlled Indonesia. Stoler does an ad-
mirable job of revealing the uniqueness and commonalities
underlying different colonial regimes' efforts to manage
these figures made contradictory by colonial officials' own
epistemological assumptions. Her primary focus is Deli
(Sumatra) under the Indonesian regime, but she weaves
in references to other colonial regimes to illustrate the de-
gree to which scholars should interpret the Dutch colonial
practices as unique or generalizable. She makes a strong
argument in the early chapters that to paint colonialism
as a uniform and systematic European project is to do an
injustice to the fragmented and ad hoc colonial responses
to specific contingencies in each location. She also argues
adroitly for a historical perspective that takes into ac-
count transformations in colonial policy as the desires of
politicians and colonial bureaucrats to foster certain
kinds of colonies changed, and as they began trying to
forge other types.
Stoler's focus is on how a particular form of classifica-
tion (racial) was the basis for a colonial perspective that
transformed people into anomalies, often ones that were
hazardous to the colonial project as a whole. What I find
captivating about Stoler's book is her convincing argument
that the very spaces where Europeans might have felt the
most comfortable asserting their cultural superiority—that
is, in the colonies—were precisely the locations in which
they were most conscious of losing their status, their white-
ness. Whereas in many accounts of recent racial formations
people invoke culture to dimly veil their racisms, in the colo-
nial context people invoked race to veil their concerns about
culture, particularly about losing cultural knowledge. Anxi-
eties concerning children's racial identities were but a point
on a continuum of colonial anxieties about the future of
Dutch children raised in the Indies.
For officials and civilians of diverse political persuasion,
the moral and physical contaminations to which Euro-
pean children were subject in the Indies served to meas-
ure how effectively domestic arrangements might con-
firm or undermine the moral tenets of European
privilege and the security of rule... .A focus on children
underscores which elements of difference were consid-
ered necessary to teach—and why agents of empire
seemed so convinced that the lessons were hard to
learn, [p. 1121
As Stoler points out, being white or being dominant can be
fragile, and this was a colonial system in which that very fra-
gility was the cause for great concern.
Whiteness's fragility in Stoler's account brings to the fore
the tensions surrounding biological origins that both Bargach
and Modell address. For Stoler, these tensions are writ large
in the colonial archive—the Dutch colonial officials were
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riveted by concerns over how and whether children raised
outside of the Netherlands could successfully become
white, especially if they had racially mixed parentage. From
the colonial perspective, whiteness was the social potential
that children might not achieve, and that they might turn in-
stead to Malay sociality was too much of a risk.
Children are of course bearers of adult culture bu t . . .
only in partial and imperfect ways. They learn certain
normative conventions and not others and frequently
defy the divisions that adults are wont to draw. In con-
trast to Elias's notion of an "automatically" channeled
production of fear, European children in diverse colo-
nial contexts seemed often to have gotten their catego-
ries "wrong." They chose Malay over Dutch, chose to sit
on their haunches and not on chairs, and chose Indo
and Javanese playmates, [pp. 119-120]
Stoler points out that raising children to be properly Euro-
pean in the colonial milieu was a daunting task that made
visible Dutch officials' expectations about culture and class.
In general, she draws out the contradictory assumptions co-
lonial officials enacted concerning the ways in which so-
cialization and race interact to produce specific identities,
showing how, for the most part, the paradoxes produced
were played out in ways that affirmed the elites in colonial
hierarchies.
By raising the question of how racial identification and
cultural belonging are interpolated, Stoler opens the door to
asking questions that are perhaps familiar to kinship theo-
rists but are framed from an unfamiliar vantage point. How
do people from different cultural backgrounds (created
through exogamy as well as colonialism) raise children who
supposedly share a common cultural perspective? In what
contexts do certain origin stories become determinate? And,
most relevant in the context of this review, how does cul-
tural knowledge shape people's membership in groups? By
discussing Stoler in the context of analysts of families, I am
reading her critique of colonial taxonomies as not only in-
terrogating colonial encounters but also, more broadly, in-
terrogating how people negotiate an emergent multiplicity
of perspectives when people's origins and social potentials
are at stake.
Joining families, joining cultures
The proliferation of common themes in these three texts—
from anxieties about the import of biological origin to the
significance and falsity of bureaucracies' involvement in
producing family as visibly bounded entities—is, I suggest,
not coincidental. Like Modell and Bargach, Stoler examines
adoption, but at a different scale. She is asking not how peo-
ple are accepted into families but how people are accepted
into cultures. By this I mean that she is addressing the ques-
tion that a perspective informed by adoption poses of social
belonging—how does one's performed cultural knowledge
both reveal and create one's ties to groups, be they families,
communities, or nations, and how do others evaluate these
claims to belonging?
Biological relatedness looms large in the ethnographic
material presented in all three books under review. Perhaps
by beginning with adoption, anthropologists more explicitly
put the onus on their interlocutors in the field to define
when and how biological relatedness becomes relevant.
This should seem a familiar and not very radical suggestion
for many discussing kinship after Schneider's (1984) inter-
ventions (see contributors to Cultures of Relatedness [Car-
sten 2000] for similar suggestions). Anthropologists respond-
ing to Schneider have often posed the problem in the
following manner: Given that biological relatedness is a uni-
versal component of people's lives that different cultures in-
corporate to varying degrees in their kinship practices, how
do particular cultures evaluate biological relatedness (see
Goodenough 2001:215-216)? To begin with adoption is to
pose the problem differently, to see biological relatedness as
constructed in the same way as other forms of relatedness,
and most importantly, as produced as a form of cultural
knowledge. It is to bring to bear the theoretical insights that
an anthropology of science can offer to a study of families. In
addition, beginning with adoption, as Modell and Bargach
point out, enables kinship theorists to ask how relations of
power underlie the ways people in their daily lives can make
biological descent relevant.6
Biological explanations are powerful in Bargach's Mo-
rocco, Modells United States, and Stoler's Dutch colonial
imagination, without the analyst offering a helping hand.
Biological relatedness is framed by the authors' interlocu-
tors as the normative relationship—the standard by which
all other relations are valued. Both Bargach and Modell are
concerned with how biological descent is viewed by each
member of the adopting triad, as well as by intervening
community-based organizations. Both address adoption as
a relationship that is significant partially because it can lead
people to think actively about the differences between cho-
sen and biological parentage and, thus, about the nature of
kinship. Stoler's target is how colonialists imagined race and
how their assumptions affected their families. All three
authors interrogate their interlocutors' reflexive stances on
how biological relatedness determines who people can be-
come.
Modell and Bargach view adoption as a topic that makes
those whom anthropologists analyze into commentators on
their own origins. In doing so, these authors open the way
for raising a question that I see as running throughout the
three books considered here—what prices do people pay
when all of the ways they are born social are located precari-
ously in biological origins? When I ask about how people are
socially born, I am referring to one of Marilyn Strathern's
(1988) interventions in kinship debates. Strathern explores
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the notion of being born social, pointing out that it is a cul-
tural or epistemological choice to view babies as asocial—as
beings that must be socialized into relationships with oth-
ers. She persuasively argues that, from a Melanesian per-
spective, it is possible to think of a child as a being whose so-
cial potentials are all present at birth, albeit inactive to
varying degrees (depending on the specific Melanesian
group). When sifting this insight through the books under
review, it becomes possible to read the ethnographic inter-
locutors under discussion as troubled by how they imagine
people are being born social, although the authors do not
say so. All three analysts describe their interlocutors as con-
ceiving of biological origin as strongly intertwined with so-
cial potential. People are born with social potentials, all of
which have biological origins. For example, Bargach argues
that a person born illegitimately can be expected to be "a
harbinger of evil" (p. 3). By explaining some social things as
having biological roots, the authors' interlocutors in the field
make charged the ways they attribute personality, futures, and
potential behavior to those who are adopted.
As a consequence, all three accounts portray adoption
as indexing an absence. Those who are adopted lack the
right kind of connections to their social identities. Con-
versely, they are always potentially able to uncover a differ-
ent identity, one that has the aura of greater authenticity.
But adoption need not always be viewed as a lack. Jane Fa-
jans offers a powerful counterexample in They Make Them-
selves (1997), her ethnography of the Baining of Papua New
Guinea. She argues that the Baining see adoptive relation-
ships as more authentic and more powerfully compelling
for each party than relationships that emerge from biologi-
cal origins. The children one adopts are the products of
one's active social labor—they are one's children because of
the constant effort to construct the relationship. The chil-
dren one gives birth to are the children one acquires without
consciously forging this relationship, and, as a result, for the
Baining, the social relationship is potentially shameful.
With adopted children the parent-child bonds are en-
tirely social. However, even with natural children, the
Baining gradually transform the substance of the rela-
tionship. Newborn children are mere projections of
their parents' natural bodily substances, but over time
they are fed and nurtured with increasing amounts of
"social" food. While these children are never entirely
transformed into social offspring—there is always a sub-
stratum of connectedness, and thus, of shame, between
them and their parents—they increasingly add social
nurturant connections on top of the biological ones. [p. 71 ]
The issue that Fajans raises is not whether the Baining be-
lieve that people can have biological bases for descent;
rather, she is pointing out that not everyone shares the same
assumptions about how people might be born social (see
Bodenhorn 2000 for a comparable example among Inuit).
Sometimes, as illustrated by the Baining or Inuit, people
configure the connections between social potential and he-
redity differently than Euro-Americans do.
To this point, I have focused on how studying adoption
can shed light on people's assumptions about the role bio-
logical origins might play in delimiting people's social po-
tential. As the authors under review reveal, the study of
adoption should not be limited to addressing only this ques-
tion. In both Modell's and Bargach's accounts, adoption
was accompanied by secrets and revelations that shaped
the ways in which people understood their identities in fam-
ily contexts. Adoption served as a springboard for under-
standing how the circulation of certain information framed
who people were. There are strong similarities in the kinds
of agencies and impotencies attributed to parents, children,
and cultures in all three ethnographic moments. For exam-
ple, all three authors address the traps people experienced
in relation to the ways their identities were perceived as un-
stable. In each context, adoption poses an irresolvable un-
certainty, the potential for someone's identity to be altered
radically at an indefinite and indeterminate moment. After
this transformation, the identity is then supposedly set.
What Modell argues, and both Bargach's and Stoler's ethno-
graphic materials support, is that this transformation is not
leading toward a new form of family but most frequently is
viewed by those involved as a way to sever previous social
ties. Both Bargach and Stoler discuss how the moment of
transformation isolates those who are changed. These
transformations occur for two reasons: because of the ways
a person is evaluated by others, based on their knowledge of
who that individual is, and because of the kinds of informa-
tion that that individual can control or access. People in
these contexts invariably attributed changes to how infor-
mation was managed, what was made secret and what was
revealed. The agencies people express in each context are
located in the control of knowledge they can exhibit about the
kinds of selves and families that are and could be fashioned.
The authors under review show that to begin with
adoption is to begin with the assumption that a person's
identity is not formed by biological kin relations. Instead,
such an approach focuses attention on the way a group's
epistemological assumptions about how selves are fash-
ioned determines the limits of whom one can be. Adoption
is thus about cultural knowledge but not cultural knowledge
as a mere possession. Rather, adoption makes visible that
having an identity is more than possessing certain knowl-
edges or knowing how to behave in particular contexts.
One's identity is determined by the epistemological as-
sumptions that a group holds about the relationships one
can have to cultural knowledge. This is apparent in the ways
Bargach and Modell talk about how social knowledge is
made biological, and it is apparent when Stoler discusses
colonial anxieties about the hazards of acculturation, when
biological origin can be corrupted by the ways people live.
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For all three authors, this realization lies in tension with
the bureaucracy their interlocutors in the field encountered
as they attempted to navigate who they could be. And this is
not surprising, given that many scholars have documented
how bureaucratic ways of knowing are based on different
principles than the principles governing the ways people
circulate knowledge in other contexts (see, e.g., Bowker and
Star 2000; Herzfeld 1992). As I mentioned earlier, these
authors are also exploring the intersection between govern-
ments and families, investigating how families become dis-
tinct and bounded entities. All three authors provide ethno-
graphic material showing that a primary way governments
and families perform their labors of division is precisely
through the tensions produced by trying to apply different
principles to the circulation of knowledge. Both Modell and
Bargach uncover this when they analyze the different ways
in which governments try to structure the knowledge of
adoption as a secret. The ways in which governments are ef-
fective in creating such secrecy turn out to be useful for re-
vealing precisely the ways in which the boundaries between
families and governments have been constructed as perme-
able. In short, analyzing adoption reveals that the govern-
ment and family become distinct systems that then interact
largely through the ways knowledge circulates according to
different principles in each arena. It is the attempt to man-
age these different principles effectively that enables ethno-
graphic interlocutors to understand the division between
state and family as a particular division.
Examining kinship through the lens of adoption brings
certain issues into sharp focus. First, scholars are enabled to
address familiar debates about biological descent from a
new angle, asking about the kinds of sociality that is sup-
posed to be transmitted through heredity rather than asking
about the relationship's authenticity. Second, the tension
between the state and the family can be understood in a new
light, as a tension actively produced rather than as the de-
marcation of an always already given boundary. Third, as
the authors here demonstrate, belonging is located in knowl-
edge, in the epistemological assumptions their interlocutors
have that determine the ways one knows who one is. In short,
examining kinship from the standpoint of adoption leads
scholars to focus on families in terms of how knowledge circu-
lates, not only in terms of secrets but also how the principles
behind the circulation of knowledge in families and communi-
ties underlie the production of identities.
Notes
Acknowledgments. This review article was greatly improved by
various people's comments: Guillaume Boccara, Debra McDougall,
Phil Parnell, Hal Scheffler, Ten Silvio, and Eileen Walsh. I want to
thank them and apologize for the moments where I did not do
justice to their interventions.
1. In both accounts, the birth parents and adopting parents are
not kin, for the most part.
2. As Modell points out here and in her previous work, the native
Hawaiian approach to adoption often comes into conflict with the
Hawaiian state bureaucracy.
3. Bargach, who currently works in Morocco, received her Ph.D.
in anthropology from Rice University in Houston, Texas.
4. Bargach's brief discussion of families' preferences for light-
skinned girls is an exception (pp. 97-99).
5. Bargach mentions in a footnote that several NGO surveys have
shown that birth mothers tend to be first-generation immigrants
from rural parts of Morocco and are often abandoned or divorced
(p. 264 n. 2).
6. For an account of biological relatedness that does not require
descent, see Francoise Heritier 1999.
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